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Abstract. It is shown that the n-player lottery contest admits a best-response potential
(Voorneveld, 2000, Economics Letters). This is true also when the contest technology
reects the possibility of a draw. The result implies, in particular, the existence of a
nontrivial example of a strictly competitive game that is best-response equivalent to a
game with identical payo¤ functions.
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1. Introduction
Potential games are interesting because they allow conclusions not only regarding existence
and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium, but also regarding the outcome of dynamic and
boundedly rational adjustment processes. Since Monderer and Shapleys (1996) seminal
contribution, the literature has produced increasingly exible variants of the initial concepts.
One such generalization has led to the notion of a best-response potential (Voorneveld, 2000;
Kukushkin, 2004; Dubey et al., 2006; Uno, 2007, 2011; Park, 2015). According to the
denition, a game with continuous strategy spaces admits a best-response potential if there
is a game with identical payo¤ functions that is best-response equivalent (henceforth BR-
equivalent, etc.) to the original game, i.e., that has the same BR-correspondence, mapping
any prole of pure strategies to a set of pure strategy proles, as the original game.
This paper has two parts. In the rst part, we show that the n-player lottery contest
admits a BR-potential. This holds true regardless of whether the contest allocates the prize
with probability one (Haavelmo, 1954; Tullock, 1975; Bell et al., 1975; Baron, 1994) or
there is a probability of a draw (Loury, 1979; Dasgupta and Nti, 1998; Blavatskyy, 2010;
Jia, 2012).1 In the second part of the paper, we exploit the useful strategic equivalence
between contests and zero-sum games,2 so as to derive a perplexing implication of our
result. Specically, it is shown that a zero-sum game may be BR-equivalent to a game with
identical payo¤ functions.
The lottery contest and its natural generalizations have found widespread application
in economics and political theory (cf. Konrad, 2009). It corresponds to a Cournot game
with isoelastic inverse demand and constant marginal costs. Deschamps (1975) proved
convergence of ctitious play in a two-player Cournot oligopoly with strictly declining BR-
functions. Thorlund-Peterson (1990) extended this result to an arbitrary number of rms
that hold point beliefs. Even an exact potential is possessed by a Cournot game with
linear demand (Slade, 1994). More generally, su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a
BR-potential have been found for aggregative games that allow monotone BR-selections
(Huang, 2002; Dubey et al., 2006; Jensen, 2010). However, all these methods do not apply
1Like this paper, Dasgupta and Nti (1998) allow for both cases.
2By strategic equivalence, we mean here vNM-equivalence (Morris and Ui, 2004), which will be dened
later in the paper. The vNM-equivalence between contests and zero-sum games, which is implicit in the early
work by Moulin and Vial (1978), was used by Pavlov (2013) to study correlated equilibria in the rst-price
all-pay auction. More recent applications include network conicts (Ewerhart and Valkanova, 2016) and
decomposable normal-form games (Hwang and Rey-Bellet, 2017).
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to the lottery contest whose BR-function is not monotone (cf. Dixit, 1987). Also more
recent examples of games that allow a BR-potential (Dragone et al., 2012; Bourlès et al.,
2015) do not cover the case of the lottery contest.
2. The lottery contest admits a BR-potential
In a lottery contest, with noise parameter a  0, common valuation V > 0, and n  2
players, each player i 2 f1; :::; ng simultaneously and independently chooses an e¤ort xi  0,
and subsequently receives a payo¤ of
uai (x1; :::; xn) =
8><>:
xi
a+ x
V   xi if a+ x > 0
V=n if a+ x = 0,
(1)
where x = x1 + ::: + xn denotes aggregate e¤ort. This game is known to possess a unique
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium that is necessarily symmetric (Dasgupta and Nti, 1998).3
An n-person game G = (X1; :::; Xn; u1; :::; un) with strategy spaces Xi and payo¤ func-
tions ui : X  X1  :::  Xn ! R for players i = 1; :::; n is called a BR-potential game
(Voorneveld, 2000) if there exists a function P : X ! R such that
argmax
xi2Xi
P (xi; x i) = argmax
xi2Xi
ui(xi; x i) (2)
for any i = 1; :::; n and any x i = (x1; :::; xi 1; xi+1; :::; xn) 2 X i  X1 :::Xi 1Xi+1
:::Xn.
The following observation has, to the authors knowledge, not been documented in the
literature.4
Proposition 1. For any a  0, the n-player lottery contest is a BR-potential game.
Proof. Consider rst the case a > 0. We claim that, in this case,
P a(x1; :::; xn) =
8<:ax+X
j<k
xjxk
9=;V   13(a+ x)3 (3)
3For a = 0, Dasgupta and Nti (1998) assume a di¤erent tie-breaking rule, viz. u0i (0; :::; 0) = 0 for
i = 1; :::; n. The BR-correspondence is the same, however.
4Cf., e.g., the surveys by Chowdhury and Sheremata (2015) and González-Sánchez and Hernández-Lerma
(2016).
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is a BR-potential for the lottery contest. Indeed, di¤erentiating (3), we nd
@P a(xi; x i)
@xi
= (a+ x i)V   (a+ x)2, (4)
where x i = x1 + :::+ xi 1 + xi+1 + :::+ xn. Moreover,
@2P a(xi; x i)
@x2i
= ( 2)  (a+ x) < 0, (5)
i.e., the problem of maximizing P a(:; x i) subject to xi  0 is strictly concave. The unique
solution xi  xi (x i; a) is given by
xi =
8<:
p
(a+ x i)V   a  x i if x i  V   a
0 if x i > V   a.
(6)
But this is just player is best-response function in the lottery contest with noise parameter
a. Hence,
argmax
xi0
P a(xi; x i) = argmax
xi0
uai (xi; x i), (7)
as claimed. Consider next the case a = 0. Denote by (x) the number of nonzero entries of
the vector x = (x1; :::; xn). We claim that, in this case,
P 0(x1; :::; xn) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(
X
j<k
xjxk)V   13x3 if (x1; :::; xn)  2
 13xjV 2 if (x1; :::; xn) = 1 and xj > 0
 13 n 1n V 3 if (x1; :::; xn) = 0
(8)
is a BR-potential for the lottery contest. To see this, suppose rst that x i has at least two
nonzero entries. Then, certainly (x1; :::; xn)  2, so that from (8),
P 0(x1; :::; xn) = (
X
j<k
xjxk)V   1
3
x3. (9)
Moreover, u0i (:; x i) is di¤erentiable, so that in straightforward extension of the case a > 0
considered above,
argmax
xi0
P 0(xi; x i) = argmax
xi0
u0i (xi; x i). (10)
Suppose next that x i has precisely one nonzero entry xj > 0. Then, (x1; :::; xn) = 2 if
xi > 0, and (x1; :::; xn) = 1 if xi = 0. Hence, using (8) another time,
P 0(x1; :::; xn) =
8<:
xixjV   13(xi + xj)3 if xi > 0
 13xjV 2 if xi = 0.
(11)
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We have to show that the problem of maximizing P 0(:; x i) subject to xi  0 has the
unique solution that is given by the best-response function of the lottery contest with noise
parameter a = 0, i.e., by xi =
p
xjV   xj if xj  V and by xi = 0 if xj > V . From the
above, it clearly su¢ ces to show that the problem max
xi0
P 0(xi; x i) has an interior solution
if and only if xj < V . But indeed, using (11), one can easily check that for xj > 0,
lim
xi!0
xi>0
P 0(xi; x i) =  1
3
x3j >  
1
3
xjV
2 = P 0(0; x i) (12)
if and only if xj < V , as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Constructing a BR-potential in the case a = 0.
Finally, suppose that all entries of x i are zero. Then, again from (8), P 0(xi; x i) =  13xiV 2
if xi > 0, but P 0(0; x i) < 0, so that argmax
xi2Xi
P 0(xi; x i) = ?. Similarly, u0i (xi; x i) =
V   xi if xi > 0, but u0i (0; x i) = V=n, so that argmax
xi2Xi
u0i (xi; x i) = ?. This proves that
P 0 is indeed a BR-potential for the lottery contest with noise parameter a = 0. 
Park (2015) has argued that, in cases where preferences are complete but the BR-set may be
empty, the BR-potential should generate the same preferences over strategies as the original
payo¤ function. To check that this condition holds for the BR-potential (8) constructed
above, note that for x i = 0,
P 0(xi; x i) =
8<:
 13xiV 2 if xi > 0
 13 n 1n V 3 if xi = 0.
(13)
Thus, the BR-potential induces a preference for lower strategies among positive strategies
xi > 0, and an indi¤erence between xi = 0 and xi = n 1n V . This is likewise true for
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preferences reecting player is original payo¤s when x i = 0, which are given by
u0i (xi; x i) =
8<:
V   xi if xi > 0
V=n if xi = 0.
(14)
Thus, the BR-potential constructed in the proof of Proposition 1 does satisfy Parks condi-
tion.
Proposition 1 easily extends to the class of contests in which the contest success function
is a strict convex combination of a purely random allocation and the above specication
(Haavelmo, 1954; Baron, 1994). The same is true for Amegashies (2006) contest success
function with noise that creates a lottery contest without the possibility of a draw yet
minimum e¤orts. Further generalizations would clearly be interesting.
3. An implication
In this section, we show that a zero-sum game may be BR-equivalent to a game with
identical payo¤ functions.
Note rst that this type of non-trivial example is impossible for the stronger notion
of vNM-equivalence (Morris and Ui, 2004).5 Indeed, suppose that a two-person zero-sum
game with payo¤ functions u1(x1; x2) =  u2(x1; x2) is vNM-equivalent to a game in which
players have the identical payo¤ function u(x1; x2). Then, there exist constants 1 > 0,
2 > 0, and functions 1 = 1(x2), 2 = 2(x1) such that
1u1(x1; x2) + 1(x2) = u(x1; x2) = 2u2(x1; x2) + 2(x1). (15)
Using the zero-sum property, this implies
u1(x1; x2) =
2(x1)  1(x2)
1 + 2
. (16)
Repeating these arguments for player 2, the game is seen to be vNM-equivalent to two
independent decision problems. Consistent with this observation, games with identical
payo¤ functions and zero-sum games have traditionally been considered as polar cases in a
broad spectrum of possible forms of strategic interaction.
5According to Morris and Ui (2004), two games are vNM-equivalent if, for each player, the payo¤ function
in one game is equal to a positive constant times the payo¤ function in the other game, plus a term that
depends only on the opponentsstrategies.
5
The following result shows that this dichotomy must be considered with care.
Proposition 2. For any n  2, there exists a nontrivial n-person zero-sum game that is
BR-equivalent to a game with identical payo¤ functions.
Proof. It follows from Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2017, Example 2) that the lottery contest
with noise parameter a = 0 is vNM-equivalent to a zero-sum game.6 Since vNM-equivalence
implies BR-equivalence, the claim is now immediate from Proposition 1. 
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